Hierarchy of social organization is a ubiquitous property of animal and human groups, linked to resource allocation, collective decisions, individual health, and even to social instability. Experimental evidence shows that both intrinsic abilities of individuals and social reinforcement processes impact hierarchies; existing mathematical models, however, focus on the latter. Here, we develop a rigorous model that incorporates both features and explore their synergistic effect on stability and the structure of hierarchy. For pairwise interactions, we show that there is a trade-off between relationship stability and having the most talented individuals in the highest ranks. Extending this to open societies, where individuals enter and leave the population, we show that important societal effects arise from the interaction between talent and social processes: (i) despite positive global correlation between talent and rank, paradoxically, local correlation is negative, and (ii) the removal of an individual can induce a series of rank reversals. We show that the mechanism underlying the latter is the removal of an older individual of limited talent, who nonetheless was able to suppress the rise of younger, more talented individuals.
Introduction. Hierarchy is a central organizing principle of complex systems, manifesting itself in various forms in biological, social, and technological systems [1] . Therefore to understand complex systems, it is crucial to quantitatively describe hierarchies [2] [3] [4] [5] and to identify their origins and benefits [6, 7] . Among the various forms of hierarchy, here we are concerned with social hierarchies emerging through competition, including dominance and status hierarchies or socioeconomic stratification [8, 9] . Ultimately, such hierarchy represents a ranking of individuals based on social consensus: a high ranking individual is expected to win a conflict against a low ranking one. This type of organization is present in societies ranging from insects to primates and humans [3, [10] [11] [12] , and has been linked to resource allocation, individual health, collective decisions, and social stability [7, [13] [14] [15] .
The prevalence of social hierarchies motivated a long history of theoretical research in statistical physics and mathematical biology [6, [16] [17] [18] [19] . The unifying theme in explaining the emergence of hierarchies is positive reinforcement of differences known as the winner effect: initially equally ranked individuals repeatedly participate in pairwise competitions, and after an individual wins, the probability that they win later competitions increases.
Conditions for hierarchies to emerge under this mechanism and their structure has been thoroughly investigated [9, 11, [18] [19] [20] ].
Yet, from experiments focusing on animal groups, we known that in addition to social reinforcement, intrinsic attributes also play a critical role in hierarchy formation [9, 11] . The relative strength of the two effects depends on context; however, it was observed that they both affect hierarchies ranging from species with relatively simple social interactions, such as cichlid fish [21] , to species that form highly complex societies, such as primates [13, 22] .
Despite the clear indication from experiments that both talent and reinforcement matter, we are lacking general theoretical understanding of their synergistic impact [23, 24] . Here, we develop a rigorous model incorporating both and show that this captures a much richer landscape. For pairwise interactions, we show a trade-off between relationship stability and having more talented individuals be the high-ranked leaders. We then extend the model to open populations, where individuals enter and leave the group, and we characterize both the global and the local structure of hierarchies.
Another pressing issue is to understand the response of hierarchical structure to perturba-tion, e.g., the effect of removing an individual. In particular, animal behavior experts must often make strategic decisions to remove individuals from captive societies due to health issues or in attempt to promote social stability, which sometimes lead to unanticipated reorganization of hierarchy and even societal collapse [14, 25] . We show herein that if either talent or social reinforcement dominate hierarchy formation, the associated models predict smooth response and no rearrangement. It is only if their effects are equally important, that removal of an individual can lead to a non-trivial series of rank reversals.
Model. Our starting point is a classic model by Bonabeau et al. that considers only social reinforcement [6] . It describes a group with N members, where the rank of each member is determined by its ability to defeat others in pairwise competitions. This ability is quantified by a score x i (t), where the subscript indexes the individuals. The scores are initially identical (x i (t = 0) ≡ 0) and they change through two discrete-time processes. First, through positive feedback: In each time step, participants are randomly paired to compete with each other, and the winner increases its score by δ. Individual i wins against j with probability
where β is an inverse temperature-like parameter: for large β the outcome of the fight is deterministic, for β = 0 both parties have equal chance to win. The second process is forgetting: The effect of a fight wears off exponentially, i.e., x i (t) is reduced by µx i (t) (0 ≤ µ ≤ 1) in each time step. Describing the full process with the deterministic equation
it was shown that, depending on the relative strength of reinforcement and decay, the model supports either egalitarian (x i ≡ 0) or hierarchical (x i ≡ 0) steady state solutions [6, 26] .
To introduce intrinsic attributes, we offset the score of each participant in Eq. (1) by base abilities b i and b j :
Parameter b quantifies talents that are independent of social processes, yet are relevant to conflict outcomes, such as strength or intelligence. This modification, although formally simple, requires new mathematical description and leads to series of non-trivial behaviors and unanticipated emergent properties.
Two individuals. To understand the consequences of intrinsic differences, it is insightful to first investigate a population of N = 2. The deterministic equation describing the steady state is
where ∆x = x 1 − x 2 and ∆b = b 1 − b 2 ≥ 0. Introducing dimensionless quantities ∆x = β∆x, ∆b = β∆b and = µ/(δβ) leads to
meaning that the steady state is determined by the talent difference and a single parameter measuring the relative strength of decay to social reinforcement [27] .
Systematically changing , we observe a transition at c (∆b) separating regimes with one and two stable solutions; the nature of the transition depends on the presence of intrinsic differences. If ∆b = 0 (Fig. 1a black line) , we recover the original model: For > c (0) we find one solution, representing the egalitarian state ∆x = 0, and at c (0) two symmetric hierarchical solutions (∆x 1 = −∆x 2 = 0) emerge through a pitchfork bifurcation. If ∆b > 0 (Fig. 1a red line) : For > c (∆b) we again find just one solution; this solution, however, is not egalitarian (∆x > 0), but it is "fair" in that the more talented individual outranks the less talented. At c (∆b) a new stable solution appears through a discontinuous transition supporting the opposite order, which is "unfair", meaning that the less talented outrank the more talented. In other words, social reinforcement can outpace intrinsic abilities. We call the ∆x > 0 solution "fair" and the ∆x < 0 one "unfair", since high-ranked individuals tend to have better access to resources, more impact on collective decisions, and higher chance to foster offspring. Figure 1c shows the dependence of c on ∆b. In general, no closed-form solution is available; limiting cases, however, can be worked out analytically: for small differences we find ( c − 1/2) ∼ ∆b 2/3 and for large differences c = ∆b −1 . The latter indicates that increasing talent difference or decreasing reinforcement pushes the system to a regime where only the fair solution exists. Since the fair solution intuitively benefits society, this prompts the question: what is the role of social reinforcement?
To answer this question, we quantify the stability of a dominant-subordinate relationship with Q, the probability that the dominant wins a conflict, Q ≈ 1/2 indicates an unstable relationship and Q ≈ 1 a well-defined relationship. Stable relationships reduce overall aggression and are positively associated with individual health [15] . Figure 1b shows that strong social reinforcement (high δ and thus low ) increases Q, revealing a fundamental tradeoff between stability and fairness: stable relationships require strong social reinforcement;
however, strong reinforcement allows for unfair hierarchical states. Similar trade-off was experimentally observed in rankings of products in a marketplace competing for the attention of consumers: strong social reinforcement led to less accuracy in selecting the highest quality product, and to larger differences in market share [28] .
Open populations. So far we focused on the relationship of two individuals, now we turn our attention to larger, changing populations. We study groups of N individuals where the talent of each individual is drawn randomly from a distribution p(b). We initially allow the population to reach a stable ranking. Then in each step, we remove a random individual and add a new member i to the bottom of the society, i.e., x i = 0, and again allow the population to reach a stable ranking.
For simplicity we restrict our investigation to the β → ∞ limit, in which case Q ij becomes a step function. This allows us to explicitly formulate the condition for two consecutively ordered individuals to reverse ranks during the evolution of the hierarchy [29] :
where b(k) is the talent of the individual ranked kth (note that k = 1 is the top and k = N is the bottom rank); and ∆x is the score difference of two consecutively ranked individuals
which turns out to be independent of their ranks [29] . Therefore, ∆x is the additional talent needed to overcome the advantage of having higher rank. Parameters δ and µ only effect the system through ∆x; therefore treating ∆x as a parameter completely specifies the dynamics. The β → ∞ limit allows us to study a simplified representation of the dynamics in Eqs. (2) and (3): We check each consecutively ranked individual and if Eq. (6) is satisfied, we reverse their order; we repeat this until no more pairs are reversed.
In the Supplemental Material, we derive various properties of the hierarchy through exact combinatorics and meanfield-like approximations [29] .
The talent b of an individual represents an intrinsic ability or a combination of abilities that influence the outcome of a fight. In our analysis we derive a number of properties of social hierarchies for general continuous talent distribution p(b), including heavy-tailed distributions. Whenever specific p(b) is necessary for calculations or simulations, we focus on the standard normal distribution. Indeed, body size, intelligence, and other relevant abilities are often normally distributed.
We now systematically investigate the structure of the emergent hierarchy as a function of ∆x, the additional talent difference needed to overcome rank difference. We measure correlation between rank and talent (τ tal ) and between rank and experience (τ exp ) using and experience-rank (green) correlation shows a crossover between talent and experience dominated limiting cases. Counter-intuitively, we find that locally talent and rank are anti-correlated (blue) as shown for local windows of increasing size w. (b) Local rank-talent anti-correlation. In the crossover regime, the expected talent increases with rank (red), yet the probability that an individual's immediate superior is less talented is greater than 1/2 (green). In (a) and (b), results are shown for populations of N = 100, continuous lines are analytical solutions [29] . Data points are simulations of the dynamics defined in Eq. (6), representing an average of 10,000 independent samples and error bars provide the 95% CI.
Kendall's tau coefficient, where experience is the amount of time an individual has spent in the population. For example, τ tal = 1 indicates talent completely determines rank and τ tal = 0
indicates no correlation. Analytical calculations and simulations show that for large ∆x, rank is dominated by experience, meaning that the only way to advance in the hierarchy is if a higher ranking individual is removed; and for small ∆x rank is dominated by talent (Fig. 2a) .
These two limiting cases are separated by a regime where both talent and experience matter, theory predicts that the crossover point, where τ tal = τ exp = 1/2, is ∆x c ≈ 0.36 for N = 100.
Experimental measurement of τ tal is challenging since it requires exact identification of the relevant talents; determining τ exp , however, is straight forward. Indeed, Tung et al. established small captive groups of macaques by introducing animals one-by-one into an enclosure and found that the Spearman's correlation between rank and experience is ρ exp = 0.61, demonstrating that some real systems are in fact near the crossover point [13] .
In addition to global correlations, we also quantify local orderedness by calculating τ tal (w), the talent-rank correlation averaged over a sliding window of length w. Counter-intuitively, Fig. 2a shows that in the crossover regime τ tal (w) is negative, meaning that locally rank and talent are anti-correlated. Figure 2b provides an additional aspect of this paradox situation:
The expected talent b(k) of an individual ranked kth at a random time step monotonically increases with rank; yet the probability that the (k − 1)th individual, the one immediately outranking the kth, is less talented than the kth is greater than 1/2.
To understand the mechanism producing the local anti-correlation, first consider two consecutive individuals forming an ordered pair with respect to talent, i. Finally, we also investigate the effect of removing an individual. We find that in the talent or experience dominated limiting cases the system's response is trivial and no reorganization happens. However, Figure 3 shows that p rr , the probability that removal of an individual induces rank reversals, is non-zero in the crossover regime. For N = 100, solutions [29] . Data points are are simulations of the dynamics defined in Eq. (6), representing an average of 50,000 time steps and error bars provide the 95% CI.
both p rr and the average number of these rank reversals N diff peak near, but not exactly at, the crossover point ∆x c . For removal-induced rank reversals to happen, at least three consecutively ranked individuals are needed in opposite order with respect to talent, i.e.,
> ∆x is satisfied, the removal of the kth individual allows the (k + 1)th to pass the (k − 1)th, which can lead to a series of rank reversals. In other words, the kth individual is not talented enough to further advance in society, but is capable of holding back a younger, more talented contender.
Understanding the response of hierarchies to external perturbation is an important issue.
Particularly, removal of animals from primate groups can sometimes lead to large shifts in hierarchy and instabilities endangering the group [14, 25] . Here we demonstrated that traditional models of hierarchy formation, those only considering either intrinsic abilities or social feedback, predict trivial response to removal, and that both effects have to be present simultaneously to observe rank reversals.
So far we have focused on populations of N = 100 individuals. In the Supplementary Material, we extract the scaling behavior of various properties for large N [29] . Local quantities, such as τ tal (2) and p rr , scale as τ tal (2) = τ
tal (2, N ∆x) and p rr = p (1) rr (N ∆x) for small ∆x; and are independent of N for large ∆x, i.e., τ tal (2) = τ (2) tal (2, ∆x) and p rr = p (2) rr (∆x). The location of their extreme value is at the crossover of these two regimes and in case of normal talent distribution scales as ∼ (ln N ) 1/6 /N 1/3 . We find universal bounds
for any continuous unbounded talent distribution, and these bounds are reached in the large population limit. For global talent correlation, on the other hand, we find that τ tal converges to one, while local correlation approaches its theoretical minimum. In Table I , we provide detailed enumeration of possible behavior in the large population limit assuming ∆xN α = C, where C > 0 is constant.
Discussion. We studied the synergistic effect of talent and social reinforcement on the structure of competitive social hierarchies, and we identified behaviors that cannot be observed if either effect dominates. Although we derived our model assuming pairwise conflicts and a winner effect, we believe that the results can be interpreted more generally: (i) The mechanism behind both local talent-rank anti-correlation and removal-induced rank reversals is that to pass someone in rank it is not enough to be more talented, but the talent difference has to be sufficient to compensate for the advantage of being higher ranked -a
tal (2, C) p In the Supplementary Material, we provide in detail the analytical solution of the model of hierarchy formation in large, dynamically changing populations. In Sec. S.2, we introduce a simplified description of the dynamics of the model in the β → ∞ limit and our overall approach that ultimately allows analytical solution. In the following four sections, we derive and analyze the global rank-talent (τ tal ) and rank-experience (τ exp ) correlation, the local rank-talent correlation for window size w = 2 (τ tal (2)), the probability of removal-induced rank reversals (p rr ), and the expected number of pairwise rank reversals (N diff ). We identify the scaling behavior of each quantity for large population sizes. Finally, in Sec. S.7, we enumerate the possible emergent hierarchies and identify their properties in the infinite population limit.
S.2. DYNAMICS IN THE β → ∞ LIMIT AND ANALYTICAL APPROACH
In this section, we setup the framework that allows us to analytically solve the model for N > 2 populations where individuals may leave and enter the hierarchy.
Consider a group of N individuals indexed i = 1, 2, 3, . . . , N , each individual is characterized by intrinsic ability or talent b i drawn from a given random distribution p(b). We initially allow the population to reach a stable ranking. Then in each step, we remove a random individual and add a new member j with talent b j to the bottom of the society, i.e.,
x j = 0, and again allow the population to reach a stable ranking.
For simplicity we restrict our investigation to the β → ∞ limiting case, in which case Q ij becomes a step function, meaning that i always wins if
In a stable ranking, the score of the kth individual, denoted x(k), is simply
Note that confusingly "high rank" corresponds to small values of k, e.g., k is higher ranked than k + 1.
The condition for two consecutively ranked individuals to reverse ranks during the temporal evolution of the hierarchy is
where b(k) is the intrinsic ability of the individual ranked kth and ∆x is the score separation between two consecutive individuals. This ∆x is independent of k, and parameters δ and µ only affect the stable ranking through ∆x; therefore, we treat it as a parameter of the dynamics. The state of the system is completely described by the ordering of individuals
, where o(k) is the index of the individual ranked kth.
After adding a new individual to the bottom of the hierarchy, we allow the system to reach a stable ranking, i.e., we allow the newcomer to rise as its talent allows. As briefly described in the main text, instead of using the dynamics defined in Eqs. (2) and (3) One further observation is required to analytically solve the model: the probability of observing the ordering O is equal to the probability of creating the same ordering by starting from a single individual and adding new members one-by-one. More precisely: At time step t = 1, we start with one individual with intrinsic ability b 1 . At the time step t = 2, we add one new individual with intrinsic ability b 2 to the bottom of the society. We repeat this step until the population reaches N individuals. In the following, we calculate properties of rankings obtained from this alternative process -due to the equivalence these properties will hold for the original model as well.
Note that here we use b(k) to denote the talent of an individual ranked kth and b t to denote the talent of an individual added at time step t.
S.3. GLOBAL RANK-TALENT (τ tal ) AND RANK-EXPERIENCE (τ exp ) CORRE-
LATION
In this section, we calculate the correlation between rank from the dynamical process and ranking based on talent or experience. We measure the correlation using the Kendall's tau coefficient, which is defined as
where n + counts the number of pairs that are in the same order in the two rankings that we compare, and n − counts the number of pairs that are in the opposite order. If the two rankings are exactly the same, τ = 1; if there is no correlation, τ = 0; and if the two rankings are exact opposites, τ = −1.
We introduce N tal − (t) as the number of individuals that arrived after t, are more talented than b t , but ultimately receive a lower rank. Therefore we can express the number of discordant pairs with respect to rank and talent as n − = N t=1 N tal − (t). Therefore Eq. (S3) for rank-talent correlation becomes
To calculate N tal − (t), we first define the threshold a(t − t, b t ), which gives the talent value below which an individual arriving at t > t cannot pass the individual that arrived at t with talent b t . According to Eq. (S2), initially talent at least a(1, b t ) = b t + ∆x is needed to pass.
This threshold increases to b t+1 + ∆x, if a new individual arrives with talent b t+1 , such that b t < b t+1 < b t + ∆x; otherwise it remains unchanged. To approximate the expectation value of a(t − t, b t ), we can write the following recursion
We can now calculate
where the summand is the probability that the individual arriving at t is more talented than b t but cannot pass it. We can now calculate τ tal by plugging in N tal − (t) into Eq. (S4). We calculate τ exp in a similar fashion. By defining N exp − (t) as the number of individuals that arrived after t and passed the individual that arrived at t; Eq. (S3) for rank-experience correlation becomes
and we can write
together with Eq. (S7) this provides τ exp .
It is worth noting that the sum of discordant rank-talent and rank-experience pairs can be evaluated as
which is independent of p(b). Inserting this into Eq. (S7) we get
, Therefore, the coefficients measuring the global talent-rank and talent-experience correlation always sum up to one.
We numerically evaluate Eqs. (S5) and (S6) and compare their predictions to simulations. Figure S1a shows excellent agreement for various population sizes. In the following we extract the scaling behavior of τ tal , τ exp , and the crossover point ∆x c (where τ tal = τ exp = 1/2) for large population sizes N .
Continuous time approximation.
To extract the scaling behavior of τ tal , we approximate Eq. (S5) for small ∆x as
We can further simplify this using continuous time approximation, leading tȯ
which can be solved by separation of varibles
For the standard normal distribution, there is no closed form of a(t, b) available; however, we can immediately note that a(t, b, ∆x) ≡ a(∆x 2 t, b) for any talent distribution. Figure S1b compares the solution of a(t, b) using the original Eq. (S5) and the approximations from Eqs. (S11) and (S12), showing good agreement for small ∆x and large t.
Next, we approximate the sums in Eq. (S6) with integrals and simplify notations:
Switching the order of integration and evaluating integrals whenever it is possible, we obtain
where we kept only leading order terms of N , and made the substitution (t − t)/N → s.
Inserting the result into Eq. (S4), we get
where the approximation is accurate for large populations. We can now see that (i) The global correlation scales as τ tal (∆x, N ) ≡ τ tal (∆x 2 N ) for large N ; therefore plotting τ tal as a function of ∆x √ N collapses the values of τ tal for large populations (Fig. S1c) .
(ii) It is a direct consequence of point (i) that the crossover point ∆x c , where τ tal = τ exp = 1/2, scales as ∆x c ∼ 1/ √ N (Fig. S1d) .
(iii) If ∆x 2 N → 0 then τ tal → 0, and if ∆x 2 N → ∞ then τ tal → 1.
(iv) So far in the calculations, we did not specify p(b); therefore the above properties are true for any continuous unbounded talent distribution.
We have shown in Eq. (S10) that τ exp = 1 − τ tal ; therefore the scaling behavior of τ exp and τ tal is identical.
S.4. LOCAL RANK-TALENT CORRELATION (τ tal (w = 2))
In this section, we derive the exact formula and scaling behavior of τ tal (w = 2), the talent-rank correlation coefficient averaged over a sliding window of w = 2, i.e., covering two consecutively ranked individuals. The window size w = 2 allows us to write
where p oo is the probability that a randomly selected consecutive pair is in opposite order with respect to talent, i.e., the individual ranked higher is less talented. For such pairs to exist the condition To proceed, we first calculate the probability that b 2 is introduced j + 1 time steps after
1. b 1 arrives with probability p(b 1 )db 1 ;
2. j individuals arrive, in order for b 2 to be consecutive with b 1 , all j individuals have to either pass b 1 or be passed by b 2 , the probability of this is (1
where P (b) is the cumulative distribution of b;
3. b 2 arrives with probability p(b 2 )db 2 .
To obtain p oo , we average this over all possible introduction times of b 1 , sum over the possible values of j, and average over all values of b 1 and b 2 that satisfy conditions in Eq. (S18):
We evaluate the sums and for simplicity we substitute b 1 → b and b 2 → b + y, leading to
Numerically evaluating the above formula and inserting its result into Eq. (S17) provides the exact solution of τ tal (w = 2), Fig. S2a shows agreement with simulations for various system sizes.
Limit of large N and small ∆x.
We now calculate p
oo , which is p oo in the large population limit such that ∆x is small. To proceed, we expand Eq. (S20) with respect to ∆x, assuming ∆x ∼ N −1 and ignoring O(N −1 ) and smaller terms, we obtain
where we relied on the relation (1 − x) N ≈ e −xN , and in the second integral we made the substitution yN p(b) → Y . We immediately note the following:
(i) The second integral is always positive, therefore ln 2 is the maximum value of p
oo . This maximum is reached in the N ∆x → ∞ limit.
(ii) p (1) oo (∆x, N ) only depends on N ∆x, i.e., p (1) oo (N, ∆x) ≡ p (1) oo (N ∆x); therefore, in case of small ∆x , plotting p oo as a function of N ∆x collapses the values of p oo for different population sizes N (Fig. S2b) .
(iii) So far in the calculations, we did not specify p(b); therefore the above properties are true for any continuous unbounded talent distribution.
We now extract the asymptotic behavior of p oo (N ∆x) in the large N ∆x limit. Preforming the substitution N ∆xp(b) → P , we get
The integrand diverges at both P = 0 and P = N ∆x √ 2π
; therefore, we separate the first integral in to two sections [0,
] and [
], note that the any O(1) separation point yields the same asymptotic behavior. Investigating the leading order terms in N ∆x, we find that the integral is dominated by the second section. Keeping only the leading order term, we get
(S23) Figure S2c compares the exact and asymptotic solution of p (1) oo (N ∆x).
Limit of large N and ∆x ∼ 1.
We turn our attention to calculating p (2) oo , which is p oo in the large population limit such that ∆x ∼ 1. Starting from Eq. (S20) and ignoring O(N −1 ) and smaller terms, we immediately obtain
To extract the asymptotic behavior of p (2) oo (∆x) in the small ∆x limit, we expand the cumulative functions in the denominator around b + y:
First, we focus on the leading order term, substituting back to Eq. (S24):
Interpreting these results we note the following:
oo , ln 2 is the maximum value of p (2) oo . This maximum is reached in the ∆x → 0 limit.
(ii) p (2) oo (∆x, N ) does not depend on N , i.e., p (2) oo (N, ∆x) ≡ p (2) oo (∆x); therefore, in case of large ∆x, the values of p oo collapse for different system sizes N (Fig. S2d) .
To extract the small ∆x behavior of p Location of maximum of p oo (N, ∆x).
We have calculated p oo (N, ∆x) in two limits: p (1) oo (N ∆x), accurate for small ∆x (Fig. S2b) ; and p (2) oo (∆x), accurate for large ∆x (Fig. S2d) . The function p (1) oo (N ∆x) is monotonic increasing, while function p (2) oo (∆x) is monotonic decreasing. Therefore the peak of p oo (N, ∆x) is at the crossover between the two limiting cases:
where ∆x * oo is the location of the maximum of p oo (N, ∆x) for fixed N . Using asymptotics from Eqs. (S23) and (S27), we obtain Figure S2f compares the scaling behavior of ∆x * oo predicted by Eq. (S29) to exact results obtained by numerically finding the maximum of p oo (N, ∆x) provided by Eq. (S20). Universal minimum of τ tal (w = 2).
We have shown that ln 2 is the maximum of both p (1) oo (N ∆x) and p (2) oo (∆x) for any continuous and unbounded p(b). This means that ln 2 is an upper bound of p oo (N, ∆x), and therefore τ tal (2) ≥ −2 ln 2 + 1 = −0.386 . . . ,
independent of the choice of p(b) and this minimum is reached in the N → ∞ limit. On Fig. S3 we show min ∆x τ tal (w = 2, N, ∆x) numerically calculated using Eq. (S20) for the standard normal distribution, the exponential distribution P (b) = λe −λb for λ = 1, and the Pareto
We indeed find that the minimum approaches −2 ln 2 + 1 for all talent distributions.
S.5. PROBABILITY OF REMOVAL-INDUCED RANK REVERSALS (p rr )
In this section we calculate p rr , the probability that the removal of a random individual To proceed with determining p rr , we first calculate the probability that b 1 is introduced j + 1 time steps before b 2 , and b 3 is introduced k + 1 time steps after b 2 :
4. k individuals arrive, in order for b 3 to be consecutive with b 2 , all k individuals have to either pass b 2 or be passed by b 3 , the probability of this is (1
5. b 3 arrives with probability p(b 3 )db 3 .
To obtain p rr , we average this over all possible introduction times of b 2 , sum over the possible values of k and j, and average over all values of b 1 , b 2 and b 3 that satisfy the conditions in Eq. (S31):
We continue following similar steps we used to analyze p oo (N, ∆x) in Sec. S.4. We evaluate the sums and for simplicity we substitute b 1 → b, b 2 → b + y, and b 2 → b + ∆x + z, which leads to
where P 1 = P (b + ∆x), P 2 = P (b + y − ∆x), P 3 = P (b + y + ∆x), and P 4 = P (b + z). Limit of large N and small ∆x.
rr , which is p rr in the large population limit such that ∆x is small. To proceed, we expand Eq. (S33) with respect to ∆x, assuming ∆x ∼ N −1 and ignoring
) and smaller terms, we obtain
where we relied on the relation (1 − 
where Li 2 (x) is the second order polylogarithm function. We immediately note the following:
(i) The second integral is always positive, therefore p
is the maximum value of p
rr . This maximum is reached in the N ∆x → ∞ limit.
(ii) p (1) rr (∆x, N ) only depends on N ∆x, i.e., p (1) rr (N, ∆x) ≡ p (1) rr (N ∆x); therefore, in case of small ∆x , plotting p rr as a function of N ∆x collapses the values of p rr for different system sizes N (Fig. S4b) .
Following similar steps as in Sec. S.4, we obtain the asymptotic behavior for large N ∆x Figure S4c compares the exact and asymptotic solution of p (1) rr (N ∆x).
We turn our attention to calculating p (2) rr , which is p rr in the large population limit such that ∆x ∼ 1. Starting from Eq. (S33) and ignoring any O(N −1 ) or smaller term, we immediately obtain
Similarly to Sec. S.4, to extract the asymptotic behavior of p (2) rr (∆x) in the small ∆x limit, we expand the cumulative functions in the denominator around b+y and b+z +∆x, respectively.
Focusing on the leading order term, we get
Interpreting the results we note the following:
is the maximum value of p (2) rr . This maximum is reached in the ∆x → 0 limit.
(ii) p (2) rr (∆x, N ) does not depend on N , i.e., p (2) rr (N, ∆x) ≡ p (2) rr (∆x); therefore, in case of large ∆x, the values of p rr collapse for different population sizes N (Fig. S4d) .
To extract the small ∆x behavior of p 
rr (∆x).
Location of maximum of p rr (N, ∆x).
We have calculated p rr (N, ∆x) in two limits: p (1) rr (N ∆x), accurate for small ∆x (Fig. S4b) ; and p (2) rr (∆x), accurate for large ∆x (Fig. S4d) . Their scaling properties are identical to p (1) oo (N ∆x) and p (2) oo (∆x), respectively; therefore, the location of the peak of p rr also scales as Universal maximum of p oo (N, ∆x).
We have shown that p (max) rr is the maximum of both p (1) rr (N ∆x) and p (2) rr (∆x) for any continuous and unbounded p(b). Therefore p (max) rr is an upper bound of p rr (N, ∆x):
independent of the choice of p(b) and this maximum is reached in the N → ∞ limit. On will form such a discordant pair, if
where a(N − t, b t ) is the threshold calculated in Eq. (S5). Therefore the total number of new discordant pairs is
where the equality follows from Eq. (S6). The function N tal − (t) was introduced in Sec. S.3, and it counts the number of individuals that arrive after t, have higher talent than the talent of the individual that arrived at t, but do not pass it.
Second, we consider the effect of removing a random individual. By removing an individual i, discordant pairs are resolved in two ways: (i) the discordant pairs that i directly participates in are no longer present and (ii) rank reversals are induced that were previously blocked by i. 
Since τ tal does not change after removing and adding an individual, the total number of discordant pairs does not change either, mathematically this means
where the first term is the effect of adding a new individual (the number of newly created discordant pairs), the second and third terms are the number of discordant pairs resolved. diff counts the events, including when no rank reversals are induced. In the main text Fig. 3 , we show the expected number of pairs that reverse order under the condition that at least one reversal happens, this can be calculated as
where p rr is the probability that at least one rank reversal happens, and it is provided by Eq. (S32). Note that N
diff is related to global correlations, while the probability that a rank reversal happens p rr is a local property dependent on the relation of only three consecutive individuals.
Continuous time approximation.
To determine the scaling behavior of N
diff (∆x, N ), we make use of the continuous time approximation introduced in Sec. S.3. Following Eq. (S15), we can write 
this result is accurate for large populations. We can now see that diff to the scaling function, provided by Eq. (S48). We find that the scaling is accurate for large populations. (c) We obtain ∆x * diff , the location of the peak of N (0) diff , by numerically finding the maximum of Eq. (S45). The location of the peak scales as ∆x * diff ∼ 1/ √ N for large populations in accordance to the continuous time approximation. We find that ∆x * diff is closely related to the crossover point ∆x c .
S.7. PROPERTIES OF THE HIERARCHY IN THE N → ∞ LIMIT
In the previous sections, we have showed that local properties (local correlation τ tal (2) and probability of rank reversals p rr ) and global properties (global correlations τ tal , τ exp and the average number of rank reversals N
diff ) have different scaling properties. Therefore the emergent hierarchy may posses different properties in the large population limit N → ∞ depending on the relationship between N and ∆x. Here we explore possible outcomes assuming
where C is constant.
Note that in the parametrization of the model, provided in Eq. (S2), ∆x = δ/[µ(N − 1)],
i.e., α = 1. Other values of α are also possible through adjustment of δ or µ, or if individuals do not randomly select opponents, but selectively compete with similarly ranked ones. Table SI enumerates the possible emergent hierarchies in the large population limit as a function of α. The most rich behavior is exhibited by the α = 1/2 case, characterized by both nonzero global correlation with both talent and experience, maximal local anti-correlation and rank reversal probability, and large-scale rank rearrangements. Other counterintuitive scenarios are also possible. For example, for 0 < α < 1/2, despite dynamics that aim to order the hierarchy according to talent, global talent correlation is zero and local correlation is negative. We anticipate that talent correlation is positive on an intermediate scale. Finally, note that negative local correlation and non-zero rank reversal probability are robust features of the hierarchies, τ tal (2) and p rr become trivial only for the unrealistic cases of 1 < α and α < 0. 
oo (C) p 
oo (C) in Eq. (S21), p
oo (C) in Eq. (S24), p
rr (C) in Eq. (S34), p
rr (C) in Eq. (S37), and f (0) (C) in Eq. (S48).
